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Abstract
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1. Introduction
Egalitarianism and meritocracy are two competing principles to distribute the joint benets from
cooperation. One could debate their relative merits and side for one or the other. Rather, we
analyze the consequences of not taking sides between these two principles, and letting di¤erent
organizations choose by vote between the two, in a context where this choice is part of coalition
formation decisions. The lack of ability to commit "a priori" on one specic distributional criterion
may lead to organizational structures and consequences that would not arise in other frameworks.
Our model is very simple.1 We consider societies composed of n individuals who must form
coalitions in order to perform certain tasks. Each individual is endowed with a productivity level.
Coalitions need a minimal size, v, to be productive. Beyond that size, a coalition produces the
sum of its members productivities. Agents prefer to get a higher pay than a lower one. If they
must choose among organizations that will pay them the same, they prefer those whose average
productivity is higher. If a coalition is formed, its members decide by majority vote whether to
distribute their production according to meritocracy or to egalitarianism. Hence, the median voter
in each coalition ends up determining the distributional rule: it will be meritocratic if the medians
productivity is above the coalitions mean, egalitarian otherwise.
Agents know the productivities of all others and can therefore anticipate what rewards they will
get from joining any given coalition. They will thus play a hedonic game (Drèze and Greenberg
(1980)), dened by the preferences of agents over the coalitions they may belong to. The outcomes
of such games are partitions of agents into coalitions. We concentrate on those partitions (coalitional
structures) that enjoy a natural property of stability, being in the core of the hedonic game induced
by our problem. Our main results refer to the characteristics of stable coalitional structures, which
we interpret as the expected result of voluntary cooperation under the basic assumption that the
majority chooses between the two possible distributional rules.
We examine the consequences of this form of coalition governance on the size, stability and
composition of organizations and on their endogenous choice of rewards. We can then apply our
understanding of coalition formation as a tool to analyze di¤erent issues within our stylized model,
like the ability of coalitions to compete for talent, or their ability to keep a competitive edge under
changes in their denitional parameters.
We nd that, contrary to the predictions of other related models, where agents of similar
1 We thoroughly discuss our assumptions in Section 2, after having presented the framework more formally.
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characteristics tend to associate into segregated coalitions, it is possible in our case that core
stability may require the cooperation among diverse individuals. More precisely, we identify general
and natural conditions under which stability is not only compatible with, but even requires the
formation of non-segregated coalitions. That departure from homophily, segregation or assortative
matching arises in our model for societies where the abilities of the predominant agents are not
extreme. We also notice that meritocracy and egalitarianism may coexist within stable societies,
and that this can happen irrespectively of the segregated or non-segregated character of stable
partitions. Hence, many combined characteristics can arise for general societies, but our results
will make the analysis of what drives these di¤erent social characteristics, and in particular the rise
of non-segregated coalitions, much more precise.
The analysis of hedonic games is never a trivial task. It always depends on the type of preferences
over coalitions of agents that are admissible in the worlds under consideration. In our case, the
family of preferences that agents may have over coalitions is dictated by the structure of the model
and by the role that voting plays over the distribution of the benets from cooperation. The
games we confront are thus more specic than those one could postulate without reference to any
particular interpretation (see Banerjee et al (2001), Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002)), and as a
result we are able to obtain clear-cut existence and characterization results for core stable coalitional
structures. At the same time, our model di¤ers from others that also give rise to specic hedonic
games but restrict the preferences of agents in alternative manners (see for example Farrell and
Scotchmer (1988), Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2006), Iehlé (2007), Bogomolnaia et al (2008),
Papai (2011), Pycia (2012)). All of them apply to domains of preferences di¤erent than those
implied by our model. For example, Pycias includes matching problems as a special case, but then
does not apply to our world because we implicitly assume an equal treatment of equals property
that is not present in the matching literature. Since we cannot rely on preceding work that derives
from di¤erent models, we o¤er a complete treatment of existence and characterization issues as an
integral part of our study.
Let us now be more specic about our formal results regarding the existence of core stable
organizational structures and their characteristics.
We rst analyze the case where potential coalitions to be formed are so large relative to the
population that only one at most can be formed. That case is interesting on its own. But we also
emphasize it because the existence of stable organizational structures is shown to depend on the
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satisfaction of a condition, the weak top coalition property, that is su¢ cient for stability under
any general hedonic game, and in that case also turns out to be necessary. The weak top coalition
property, rst introduced in Banerjee at al (2001), is used at that point but also along the rest of
the paper. Next, we turn to the analysis of three type societies, where individuals are restricted
to have three possible productivity levels: high, medium and low. Modeling a society through
such a three-way partition is certainly limitative, but also a reference case, that is resorted to in
other contexts2. A major contribution of our paper is the full characterization of stable coalitional
structures for this special case, and its generalization to what we call three-way clustered societies,
that is, societies with an arbitrary number of types but whose members are clustered into at most
three distinct coalitions of agents whose productivities are "similar" within each cluster and yet
"su¢ ciently di¤erentiated" across them.
The detailed study of three-way clustered societies is complex, but its essential features can
be grasped by a close examination of the case where there are only agents with three types and
v = n=2: that is where the number of agents in society allows for the possibility of just forming
two coalitions. In that case, the conditions under which non-segregated coalitions necessarily arise
as part of the unique core stable organizational structure become transparent. Interestingly, these
cases correspond to situations where the predominant type in society is the middle one, while high
and low types are relatively few. More in general, the cases where non-segregation must be expected
are also identied.
Our model is denitely simple, yet complicated enough to analyze. Hence, we o¤er it as a rst
step, that we hope provides robust enough insights, and may be used as a starting point for further
developments. As a rst test of its robustness we present a variant of it, where the e¤ort that
agents contribute to coalitions may vary, depending on the reward they expect to get.
In this new set up meritocracy is easier to sustain, and this works in favor of the stability
of segregated organizations. Yet, we can still identify a family of societies admitting core stable
structures where non segregation necessarily arises.
Our work contributes to the literature on the endogenous formation of institutions, local public
goods, clubs, and sorting (Tiebout (1959), Schelling (1969), Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1994), Ellickson
et al (1999), Piccione and Razin (2009) and Morelli and Park (2014)). Piccione and Razin (2009)
and Morelli and Park (2014) share our main general motivation: examining coalition formation
2 People are classied by social status into the elite, the middle and the lower class; countries are classied into
developed, developing and less developed, etc..
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jointly with endogenous institutions of distribution in societies where individuals are vertically dif-
ferentiated in productivities. Both of these papers assume more complex production possibilities
and coalition externalities than us; their coalition formation games are not hedonic. What distin-
guishes our formulations is the assumption that coalitions are committed to a majoritarian decision,
which combined with very simple production assumptions delivers an hedonic game. By choosing
a framework of maximal simplicity and using the very fundamental concept of core stability, we
hope to signal that the di¢ culties and features that arise here are deeply rooted in the analysis of
the coalition formation problem.
The paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, Section 2 presents the basic model
and discusses a variety of examples that announce the main messages of the paper. Sections 3,
4 and 5 discuss the existence of stable organizational structures, and their characteristics under
di¤erent situations. In Section 3 we emphasize su¢ cient conditions and their consequences for the
case where productive organizations must be large relative to societys size. Section 4 is devoted
to three-type societies, and Section 5 extends its results to the case of three clustered societies.
Section 6 introduces the possibility of variable e¤ort levels, and Section 8 concludes with some nal
remarks.
2. The basic model and its derived organizational structures
In this section we present our basic model, and we then illustrate, by means of examples, the
richness of implications that arise from it, regarding the variety of organizational structures that
may occur in stable societies, their sensitivity to di¤erent distributions of productivities, and the
role of voting as a possible source of instability. The examples are also used to provide an overview
of some of the formal results that will be presented in subsequent sections, on the existence and
characterization of stable organizational structures.
Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng be a set of n individuals characterized by their individual potential pro-
ductivities  = (1; :::; n) with 1  :::  n  0: Non-empty subsets of N are called coalitions.
Individuals can only become productive if they work within a coalition G  N of size at least v:
Coalitions of smaller size produce nothing, while coalitions of size v or larger produce the sum of
their membersproductivities. A society is represented by a triple (N;; v):
We refer to a coalition of cardinality less than v as being unproductive. The top set T = f1; :::; vg
contains the rst v agents in terms of productivity. Similarly for any G  N; T (G) denotes the
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rst v agents in G:
We denote the average productivity of a coalition G  N by G, and by G the vector of
productivities of the agents in G.
If a productive coalition is formed, its total production must be distributed among the agents of
the coalition. Agents prefer to get a higher than a lower pay. Lexicographically, if they must choose
among organizations that will pay them the same, they prefer those whose average productivity is
higher.
Productive coalitions internally decide, by majority voting, whether to distribute their product
in an egalitarian or in a meritocratic manner. That is, whether all agents in the organization G
get the same reward, G, or each one is rewarded by its productivity, i. There is no way to
commit a priori to any of these two principles. A majority in coalition G will favor meritocracy
if the productivity of the median, m(G); is greater than G. Otherwise, the majority will be for
egalitarianism. Ties are broken in the following way: if there are more than one median agent, ties
are broken in favor of the agent with the highest productivity. If the productivity of the median
agent is equal to the mean productivity, we consider that the coalition is meritocratic. These tie
breaking rules are just a convention and inconsequential for the results.
We assume that all agents are fully informed about the characteristics of all others. This is a
strong but very standard assumption, especially in the theory of cooperative games. Knowing the
productivities of their potential partners, they can anticipate what reward they would get if joining
any given coalition. Thus, they will play a hedonic game (Drèze and Greenberg (1980)), where
outcomes are partitions of agents into coalitions. A natural prediction is that stable partitions will
arise from playing these games. The following denitions formalize the stability concept that we
use in this paper.
Denition 1. Given a society (N;; v); an organizational structure is a partition of N denoted by
: Two organizational structures,  and 0; are equivalent if for all G 2  there is G0 2 0 such that
G = G0 and viceversa. A coalition G is segregated if given i and j in G with i < j ; and k 2 N
such that i  k  j ; k 2 G: An organizational structure is segregated if it contains at least two
coalitions and all the coalitions in the partition are segregated.
Denition 2. An organizational structure is blocked by a coalition G if all members in G are
strictly better o¤ in G than in the coalition they are assigned in the organizational structure. An
organizational structure is core stable if there are no coalitions that block it.
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We concentrate on the concept of core stability, rather than resorting to the often used concept of
Nash stability, and this has interesting implications regarding interpretation . Models of coalition
formation often assume implicitly that coalitions, when forming, may be conditioned by some
exclusion rules, indicating under what conditions can agents enter the coalitions they would like to
join. The role of such rules has been analyzed in Jehiel and Scotchmer (2001), who present a variety
of them, ranging from no exclusion to unanimity requirements for admission. In our world, stability
arises when coalitions of agents voluntarily agree to form, and they need not admit anyone who
would decrease their level of satisfaction. Thus, informally, we interpret the use of core stability
to be closely connected with the assumption of unanimity, while the Nash approach would rather
reect a world with no exclusion rules.
Now, as promised in the introduction, let us discuss our main assumptions.
Our assumption that productive coalitions must reach a minimum size v is a very simple way to
introduce positive group externalities in production. It is indeed a drastic, very stark specication,
and one can think of others. An alternative specication that would still leave us within the realm
of hedonic games would come from assuming that a coalition is productive only if the sum of its
members productivities reaches a minimal thershold. A richer one would condition the required size
for a coalition to become productive on the characteristics of the rest of coalitions with which they
must co-exist. This would certainly lead to a more complex game, beyond the hedonic framework.
These and other forms of externalities in production would be worth studying, and possibly t some
applications better than our present formulation. But since our assumption delivers a tractable
model and has meaning, we take it as a signicant rst step.
Our assumption that preferences are essentially based on individual rewards but are lexico-
graphically complemented by the aggregate productivity of the group is again a very simple form
of introducing an externality, this time on the valuation of outcomes. The specication has content:
we may think of the lexicographic component as a measure of the prestige associated with joining
a coalition. And its introduction still allows for the model to be tractable. It is important to
point out that our results are robust to the natural change in the specication of preferences that
would just drop the lexicographic component. That would not change our main conclusions, though
existence proofs would be easier and some of our uniqueness results would not be so sharp, due
to the increase of stability that these less discriminating preferences would bring with them. Our
text includes comments on the potential consequences of dropping this assumption in any instance
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where it plays a signicant role3.
Another assumption is that agents will be equally productive regardless of the reward they get.
In Section 6 we present a model showing that our results are robust, even if agents can condition
their e¤ort to their pay.
We now present di¤erent examples that will illustrate the richness of implications arising from
the fact that agents do vote on distributional issues.
Our rst example shows two important and independent points. The rst one is that in a core
stable organizational structure di¤erent reward systems may coexist. The second one is that a core
stable organizational structure may be non-segregated. The example shows how people that are
diverse may nd an advantage to get together for distributional reasons.
Example 1. A society with stable non-segregated organizations where di¤erent reward systems
coexist.
Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10g ; v = 5; and  = (100; 100; 75; 75; 75; 75; 75; 75; 75; 45): Let G1 =
f1; 3; 4; 5; 10g and G2 = f2; 6; 7; 8; 9g: Note that G1 is meritocratic and G2 is egalitarian. Let us see
that the organizational structure  = (G1; G2) is core stable. Note that the medium type agents
in G2 can only improve if a high type is added to the coalition or if a medium type is substituted
by a high type. But since the other high type not in G2 is already in a meritocratic coalition, he
does not have incentives to form the potential blocking coalition. The two high types cannot be
together in a meritocratic coalition, and any other agent needs high types to improve. That implies
that  is a core stable organizational structure. Note that high and medium productivity agents
are split between the two coalitions. Any other core stable organizational structure is equivalent
to this one.
Notice, for further reference, that this is an example of a society with three types of individ-
uals, dened by three di¤erent productivity levels, and whose numbers allow to form exactly two
productive coalitions. Well see in Section 4 that for societies with these characteristics, stability
is always guaranteed (Proposition 4) and that in fact this is a special case where the core stable
organizational structures are necessarily non-segregated and unique (Proposition 5).
At this point, we want to emphasize that in our model it is not only possible, but even necessary
in many cases, to have non-segregated coalitions in stable societies. This is in sharp contrast with
3 See footnotes 9 to 14 in the text, and Example 8 in the Appendix.
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the results that one would obtain if one of our two distributional rules was imposed, or, in the other
extreme, if the choice of rewards was fully open to negotiation. If agents were forced to adopt a
xed distributional rule, either meritocracy or egalitarianism, the stable organizational structure
would be segregated: the one where the v most productive agents get together, then the next v
most productive form a second coalition, and so on, thus eventually leaving some agents out of any
productive coalition. Segregation would also be the consequence of stability in the polar case where
agents could freely bargain how to distribute the gains from cooperation. Whenever a (core) stable
allocation of gains exists, it must be one where each agent gets her productivity. This forces all
stable societies to be segregated4. For example, when n = kv for some integer k, the unique stable
structure would again be the one we just described, under a meritocratic reward scheme.
By contrast, in our model, the ability of societies to vote between our two distributional criteria
gives rise to the possibility of non-segregated stable organizational structures. Even more: non-
segregation may become necessary for stability in some cases we shall be able to pinpoint5.
Unfortunately, existence issues arise, both under free bargaining and in our case. When there
are no constraints on the possible rewards to agents, guaranteeing their productivity to the highest
productive agents may require to leave some of the lowest in an unproductive coalition. Then those
individuals have reservation value zero and can be o¤ered low rewards to form blocking coalitions.
As we shall see, instability may also be unavoidable in our model for some societies. But, as shown
in the examples that follow (Examples 2 and 3), it will arise in subtler ways than in the case of
bargaining. Among other di¤erences, in our case stability may be compatible with some agents
being left into unproductive coalitions (Example 4).
Example 2. A society with no core stable organizational structures.
Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9g ; v = 5; and  = (100; 100; 75; 75; 75; 75; 75; 75; 30). In any orga-
nizational structure there will be at most one productive coalition. The egalitarian coalition that
contains the two high type and three medium type agents dominates any organizational structure
containing some other productive egalitatarian coalition. In turn, if that maximal egalitarian coali-
tion is part of an organizational structure, this will be dominated by the meritocratic coalition
4 Our assumption that, under equal rewards, individuals lexicographically favor coalitions of greater mean is im-
portant here. Otherwise, any structure where all individuals are in some productive coalition and each gets his
productivity would be stable as well.
5 In Bogomolnaia et al (2008) non-segregated groups also arise from the combination of voting and group formation.
In their model agents in a group decide by vote the location of a public good, but share its cost equally.
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formed by one high, three medium and the one low type agents. Notice however that all productive
coalitions that contain both high type agents are egalitarian. Therefore, organizational structures
with a productive meritocratic coalition must leave at least one high type in the unproductuive
coalition. But then, this structure will be blocked by the egalitarian coalition formed by one high
and four medium type agents. Thus, there is no core stable organizational structure.
For further reference, notice that in this example it is only possible to form one productive
organization, at most. Thus, we are in a world where the minimal size of productive organizations
is large relative to the overall population. This case is examined in Section 3, and there we provide
a necessary and su¢ cient condition for existence of stable organizational structures. This condition
requires societies to satisfy the weak top coalition property, a su¢ cient condition for stability under
any general hedonic games that turns out to be also necessary in this case.
In the following example we show that the issue of existence may also arise in societies allowing
for larger numbers of potential coalitions, and even if a priori there is no need to leave any agent
outside of a productive coalition.
Example 3. A society with no core stable organizational structure, n = 3v.
Let N = f1; :::; 9g;  = (100; 75; 75; 75; 25; 25; 25; 25; 25); v = 3. In order to prove that no or-
ganizational structure is stable, it is enough to show that, in a stable structure, the high type
productivity agent cannot belong to an unproductive coalition, cannot be part of an egalitarian
coalition, and cannot be part of a meritocratic coalition. Clearly, if the high productivity agent
is in unproductive coalition, no matter how the other agents are organized, medium type agents
will always prefer to form a productive coalition with the high type one. If the high type is in
an egalitarian coalition, it has to be the one with the greatest mean that leaves behind one of the
medium type agents. The rest of the society has to be organized in a stable way, which implies an
egalitarian coalition with productivities (75; 25; 25) and a meritocratic coalition with productivities
(25; 25; 25): The high type agent, together with the medium type agent in the second coalition and
a low type agent in the third coalition, can form a meritocratic coalition that blocks that organi-
zation. Finally, if the high type is in a meritocratic coalition, this coalition contains medium type
agents, but independently of how the rest of agents are organized, the coalition of medium type
agents blocks that organization.
Once more, for further reference, observe that we are again in a case with only three types of
agents, as in Example 1. However, the size of society now allows for more than two productive
10
coalitions to form, whereas in Example 1 only two coalitions at most could arise. As we shall see
in subsection 4.2, this larger relative size of society does no longer guarantee that stability holds.
More specically, our example here fails to satisfy a condition that we identify in subsection 4.2 and
Proposition 5, as being necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of stable organizational structures
in general, three type societies6.
The next example shows that, unlike in the case where individuals could freely bargain for
their rewards, instability is not necessarily associated with the existence of agents who are left out
of productive coalitions. It also shows that even in the event where several coalitions of minimal
productive size could form, stability may generate the emergence of larger coalitions.
Example 4. A case where n = kv, and yet no partition of agents into coalitions of size v can
achieve stability.
Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g ; v = 3; and  = (50; 40; 40; 35; 25; 10): Let (P;U) be an organizational
structure where P = f1; 2; 3; 5g and it is meritocratic and U = f4; 6g and it is an unproductive
coalition. (P;U) cannot be blocked because P is the meritocratic coalition with the highest mean
and the only agent that could improve without using anyone from P is agent 4 but f4; 5; 6g is
meritocratic. The egalitarian coalition with the greatest mean is E = f1; 2; 3g; NnE is meritocratic.
The organization (E;NnE) is blocked by G = f1; 4; 6g which is a meritocratic coalition with a
greatest mean than NnE: Any organization with two meritocratic coalitions or one meritocratic
and one unproductive coalition is blocked by P; any organization with two egalitarian coalitions
or one egalitarian and one unproductive coalition is blocked by E: Any organization where the
most productive agent is part of an egalitarian coalition di¤erent from E and the other coalition is
meritocratic is blocked by E: It can be checked that any other organization is blocked by P: Thus,
(P;U) is the unique core stable organizational structure.
The examples that follow are intended to show that our model is amenable to perform some
comparative static analysis. Before we introduce them, let us clearly state that this type of exercise
is well grounded, because in the sections that follow we shall identify conditions guaranteeing that
core stable equilibria are almost unique, in a well dened sense. Our examples below conform to
society characteristics implying almost uniqueness, as it was also the case in our Example 1.
We rst remark that the issue of stability is related to the size of minimal productive coalitions
in a non-trivial manner.
6 This condition requires that societies be structured, according to Denition 6 in subsection 4.2.
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Example 5. Changes in v can be either stabilizing or de-stabilizing.
Let N = f1; 2; :::; 7g and  = (100; 84; 84; 84; 84; 60; 60): Suppose that initially v = 4:
Note that medium type agents can form a coalition by their own with a payo¤of 84. The egalitarian
coalition with the greatest mean is blocked by the meritocratic coalition containing the high, one
medium and two low type agents. Any meritocratic G with the high type is blocked by the four
medium agents together. No organizational structure is stable.
But, if v = 3; (G1; G2; U); with G1 = f1; 2; 6g and G2 = f3; 4; 5g both meritocratic and U = f7g
unproductive is a core stable organizational structure, because the high type is in a meritocratic
coalition and he cannot increase the mean above 84 while keeping meritocracy.
Our last example is suggestive of a variety of applications that might derive from our model,
if embedded in a more general setting. Let us rst exhibit the example and then comment on its
possible implications.
Example 6. Changes in v and n can modify the distributional criteria in stable organizational
structures.
Let N = f1; :::; 14g; v = 7;  = (10; 10; 7; 7; 7; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1):
The organization structure (T;NnT ); where the top set T is meritocratic and NnT is egalitarian
is core stable. Assume now that the size of coalitions, and the set of potential participants must
be reduced to v0 = 5 and N 0 = f1; :::; 10g. It would seem natural to re the two worse people
of each coalition, so that the productivities in this new society are 0 = (10; 10; 7; 7; 7; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1).
The organization (T 0; NnT 0), remains core stable for (N 0; v0; 0). Yet, in that case, the top coalition
in this organization becomes egalitarian. Whereas, if the rst organization would have red two
of the medium productivity agents, rather than the two low ones, the core stable partition of the
resulting smaller society would still be meritocratic.
This example has been chosen to identify the potential consequences of changes in parameter
v that may be interpreted as budget cuts. We do not want to exaggerate the importance of the
example, but notice that it could become the starting point of a study regarding the ability of
societies to compete in a larger world. What happens in the example is that the best coalition may
end up shifting from meritocracy to egalitarianism at equilibrium. We have not modeled external
competition for high level individuals, but we could assume that the most productive agents are
likely to get outside options involving rewards higher than average. Under these unmodeled but
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reasonable assumption, our example is a warning that changes that make viable smaller coalitions
may have a high decapitalizing e¤ect in societies where distributional decisions are made by the
majority.
Similar and apparently anomalous phenomena would arise as the potential result of other
parametric changes. In the same example, if the low type members would upgrade their qual-
ications close to the medium type, say from 1 to 6, meritocracy would also be lost in stable
organizational structures.
3. Su¢ cient conditions for core stability, and their necessity when organizations
must be large
Simple su¢ cient conditions assuring the existence of core stable organizational structures are easy
to describe. For any distribution of productivities guaranteeing that segregated coalitions are
meritocratic, any organization of society into segregated coalitions of minimal size is core stable.
This is the case for example, under a uniform or concave distribution7, that is, when for any three
consecutive agents i; j; k with i  j  k; k   j  j   i. Other environments where the
existence of core stable organizational structures is guaranteed are those where all agents have
the same productivity (one type societies), or are divided into two sets, the set H of nH identical
individuals of high type and a set L of n nH identical individuals of low type (two type societies).
Existence in the rst case is trivial. In the second case, if nH  v; the organizational structure
(H;L) is trivially core stable. If nH < v; the reader may check that the organizational structure
(T;NnT ) is also core stable. In the following section we shall discuss the much richer case where
agents come in three di¤erent types, and show that existence issues become challenging then.
We now turn attention to a more general condition, that is in fact su¢ cient for existence of core
stable organizational structures in general hedonic games: the weak top coalition property (Banerjee
et al, 2001). We begin by proving that identifying weak top coalitions in our model, when they exist,
is an easy task (Proposition 1). In addition to its intrinsic interest, this result is used in subsequent
sections, when searching for potential candidates to form core stable organizational structures. We
then show that the weak top coalition property has additional bite in societies where n < 2v, and
thus only one productive coalition can be formed, at most. For these simple societies requiring large
minimal size organizations relative to total population, the weak top coalition property is necessary
7 In the dual case, where all segregated groups are egalitarian, the organization of society into segregated groups of
minimal size does no longer assure core stability.
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and su¢ cient for core stable organizational structures to exist (Proposition 2). Finally, we identify
those societies that are su¢ ciently small for existence to be guaranteed in any case (Proposition
3).
Denition 3. A coalition W  G  N; is a weak top coalition of G if it has an ordered partition
(S1; :::; Sl) such that (i) any agent in S1 weakly prefersW to any subset of G; and (ii) for any k > 1;
any agent in Sk needs cooperation of at least one agent in [m<kSm in order to form a strictly better
coalition than W . A game satises the weak top coalition property if for any coalition G  N; there
exists a weak top coalition W of G:
If the weak top coalition property is satised, a core stable organizational structure, (G1; :::; Gm)
always exists and can be constructed by sequentially selecting weak top coalitions from the popu-
lation: G1 is the weak top coalition of N , G2 the weak top coalition of NnG1, and so on 8.
We can now show that in our model, weak top coalitions, if they exist, must have a very specic
and simple form. This fact will greatly simplify our discussion of stability, and is therefore an
important step to be repeatedly used in our proofs.
Before discussing the form of weak top coalitions, lets introduce the notion of a congruent
coalition (Le Breton et al (2008)).
Denition 4. A coalition C  G  N; is a congruent coalition of G if for all i 2 C; and for all
S  G such that S is a strictly better coalition than C for i; there is an agent j 2 S \C such that
C is a strictly better coalition than S for this agent j:
Note that any weak top coalition of G is a congruent coalition of G.
We can now state our characterization result for weak top coalitions of G.
Proposition 1. Let M+(G) be the set of meritocratic coalitions of G with the greatest mean, and
let E+(G) be the set of egalitarian coalitions of G with the greatest mean. A coalition W is weak
top coalition of G if and only if it is a congruent coalition of G, and either belongs to M+(G) or to
E+(G).9
8 Stronger conditions can be found in the literature that guarantee core stable organizational structures. For example,
the Top Group Property (TGP), requires that any group G of agents contains a subgroup that is the best subset of
G for all of its members (Banerjee et al, 2001). The TGP is a relaxation of the common ranking property introduced
by Farrell and Scotchmer (1988). Under those conditions the core is nonempty and it has a unique element.
9 If we drop the lexicographic assumption on preferences among equal reward coalitions, the set of potential weak
top coalitions will still include E+(G) and now will be enlarged to any congruent meritocratic group, in addition to
E+(G):
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The proof is presented in the Appendix.
Consider next societies where organizations must be relatively large so that only one productive
coalition can be organized, i.e. v > n=2. In these societies the weak top coalition property is
necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of core stable organizational structures.
Proposition 2. A society where v > n=2 has core stable organizational structures if and only if
N has a weak top coalition.10
Proof. Su¢ ciency is clear: just partition the society into the weak top coalition of N and leave
the other agents together in an unproductive coalition.
Necessity follows from the fact that if a partition  = (P;NnP ) is in the core, P 2 M+(N) or
P 2 E+(N): Since  cannot be blocked, there is no coalition S  N such that all i 2 S \ P are
better o¤ in S than in P: Thus, P is congruent and by Proposition 1 it is a weak top coalition of
N:
A direct application of Proposition 2 is the following.
Proposition 3. In societies where v > 3n=2 a weak top coalition of N always exists. Therefore,
there are always core stable organizational structures.
Proof. Let T = f1; :::; vg: If the top set T is meritocratic, it is trivially a weak top coalition of
N and thus the core is not empty. Let us see that if T is egalitarian it is also a weak top coalition
of N: Note rst that all agents with productivity below the mean are in their best coalition. Only
agents above the mean could improve. But, since the coalition is egalitarian, the mean is above
the median and thus the coalition that can improve has a cardinality smaller than v=2: But the
unproductive coalition I = fv + 1; ::; ng also has a cardinality smaller that v=2: Thus, there is no
way of forming a coalition that can improve upon T:
Note, however, that existence of core stable organizational structures is not guaranteed when
n=2 < v < 3n=2 as we have shown in Example 2, where neither the meritocratic coalition with
the greatest mean (the coalition of the medium productivity agents), nor any of the egalitarian
coalitions with the greatest mean (the two high plus three medium productivity agents) are weak
10 Proposition 2 still holds if we drop the lexicographic assumption on preferences among equal reward coalitions.
Since more weak top coalitions can exist, as remarked in the previous note, the set of stable organizational structures
may be enlarged.
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top coalitions of N:11
Finally, let us make clear that when v  n=2; the weak top coalition property is not a necessary
condition for the existence of core stable organizational structures. This can be checked in Example
1.
4. Three-type societies
In this section we begin to study the benchmark case where agents can be classied into three
classes. As we already remarked in the introduction, the study of such cases is standard and
productive in many contexts. What we add here is that agents within each class have exactly the
same productivity level, which we identify with their type. In Section 5 we extend r esults to the
case where the three classes can still be clearly identied and yet productivities can di¤er across
individuals within each class.
Formally, in a three type society, (N;; v); a generic type is denoted by j; j 2 fh;m; lg; and
productivities are h > m > l: We denote by H; M; and L the sets of all high, medium and
low type agents respectively, and by nH ; nM and nL the cardinality of these sets. The order
of individuals of the same type is arbitrary and will have no e¤ect on our results. Note that
because of this arbitrariness, any two organizational structures which only di¤er in the numbering
of individuals of the same type are equivalent. In what follows when we refer to uniqueness of core
stable organizational structures, we mean that they are all equivalent.
In Section 4.2 we present a general, necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of stable
organizational structures for three type societies. Before that, in Section 4.1, we analyze the special
case where v = n=2: This case is interesting for several reasons. One is that, in that case, existence
is always guaranteed. Moreover, we can then identify and characterize those societies where non
segregation is not only possible but in fact is required for stability, and the line of proof for our
characterization result in this admittedly very special case already contains the main features of
the proof for the more general case we consider right after, while avoiding some complications.
11 This non existence problem will not be alleviated by dropping the lexicographic assumption on preferences among
equal reward coalitions. See Example 2, where that assumption plays no role.
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4.1. The case of three types and v = n=2
Our initial purpose in this section is to prove that in this case stable organizational structures will
always exist. Remember that in Section 3 we already proved that, should there only be one or
two types in society, existence is guaranteed. So, we must just prove it for the non-degenerate case
where there is at least one agent of each type. To do so, it is useful to concentrate on the segregated
partition (T;N=T ) where a coalition of most productive agents of size v is formed, and the rest of
agents gather together in a second coalition. We shall prove that either this structure is in the core,
or else a di¤erent organizational structure will be core stable, unique and include a non-segregated
coalition.
To distinguish between these two cases, let us classify societies by introducing the distributional
characteristics of productivities that will mark the di¤erence between their stable structures. The
denition that follows has technical consequences, but we want to emphasize that it covers situations
that will plausibly apply in many applications: it requires that the bulk of population be of a
medium type, with a few highly productive agents and also some low productivity agents, and
imposes some additional constraints on the ability to form meritocratic coalitions involving the
three types.
Denition 5. A society is maximally mixed meritocratic if nH < v=2; nL  v=2; and (h + m +
nLl)=(nL + 2)  m:
In maximally mixed meritocratic societies we can always construct a meritocratic coalition
of cardinality v that contains agents of all three types, all agents of the low type and the highest
number of high types allowing for all the preceding characteristics to hold. We call this a maximally
mixed meritocratic coalition, and denote it by M3: This coalition can be constructed as follows.
Start with all nL low types, one medium type and one high type. This starting coalition may not
be productive, but the mean of its 0s is below m: Next add as many high types as possible while
keeping the mean of the 0s below m. And nally, if the coalition is not yet productive, ll the
set with medium types until reaching size v: Note that NnM3 is either an egalitarian coalition
with high and medium type agents, or a meritocratic coalition with only medium type agents.
Remark that an organizational structure that contains a coalition with the characteristics of M3 is
non-segregated.
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Proposition 4. (a) In three type societies where v = n=2, stable organizational structures always
exist.
(b) If societies are maximally mixed meritocratic, then the structure (M3; N=M3), where M3 is
non-segregated, is the only stable one.
(c) If societies are not maximally mixed meritocratic, then the segregated organizational structure
(T;N=T ) is stable, and there is at most one another stable structure. 12
The proof of of Proposition 4 is in the Appendix. The reader may want to read that proof
carefully before going to the more general one of Proposition 5, because, as already pointed out,
this one is a good and simpler introduction to the main ideas that also appear in the latter.
Let us highlight the features of stable structures in our special case, since they will basically
extend when we allow for n > 2v.
One rst lesson refers to segregation. For societies that are maximally mixed meritocratic,
stability implies non-segregation, as proven in Propositions 4. For societies that are not, we can
assert for sure that stability holds for the segregated structure (T;NnT ), but this is sometimes
compatible with the existence of a second stable structure which may be non-segregated.
A second set of remarks refer to the combinations of reward schemes that are compatible within
core stable organizational structures. In societies that are maximally mixed meritocratic, at least
one of the coalitions in a stable structure must be meritocratic, while the second coalition may
adopt meritocracy or egalitarianism. In societies where (T;NnT ) is stable, each one of the two
sets can adopt any of the two distributional criteria. Moreover, note that in this case the resulting
distributional criteria are determined by the number of agents of each type that belong to each of
the two sets, and not on the exact values of their productivities.
The (almost) uniqueness results in the present section provides the grounds for the use of
comparative statics that we have discussed in the Examples of Section 2.
4.2. Three-type societies: the general case.
In this subsection we discuss the characteristics of three-type societies where core stable organiza-
tional structures exist and also the form that these structures take under di¤erent conditions.
12 This is a case where the lexicographic assumption on preferences among equal reward coalitions has some conse-
quences. All statements remain true, except that the non-segregated organizational structure described in (b) is no
longer the unique stable one: the segregated organizational structure with minimal size productive coalitions would
also be.
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We shall distinguish between two sets of societies, that we call structured and unstructured,
and prove that the limits between the two indeed determine whether or not core stability can be
attained. We can prove that core stable organizational structures will exist in a society if and only
if it is structured.
The reader will appreciate that many of the ideas that arose in the preceding subsection do
come back, but with some additional complications that were avoided in the case where only two
productive coalitions could be formed.
Since the denition of a structured society is complex, we start by describing its characteristics
from two di¤erent perspectives.
First, regarding the type of coalitions that may be part of core stable structures. We will prove
that such structures must either contain the top set T or some meritocratic coalition G with high
type agents. Although this does not provide a full description of the whole structure, it points
at a salient coalition in it. Well say that core stable partitions must be structured around T or
around some meritocratic G, meaning that one of these sets has to be part of the partition and
that the rest of society must be able to accommodate the further requirements imposed by overall
stability. As a result, stability requires in all cases that some of the high type agents are part of
a coalition where they get their best possible treatment. They will either be all part of the best
egalitarian coalition, when no stable partition can be structured around any meritocratic coalition
containing high types, or else some of them will manage to structure a stable organization around a
meritocratic coalition, where they get paid their full productivity, even if sometimes at the expense
of other high type agents.
Second, we can look at the requirements that separate these two types of societies. In order
to be unstructured, a society must have a rather special distribution of types. In particular, it
must satisfy at least the following requirements: (i) It must be that the number of high type agents
is less than v=2. Otherwise, they could form a meritocratic coalition including all of them, and
let the remaining members of society, which will now be of at most two types, to organize in a
stable manner. (ii) In addition, unstructured societies must contain a number of middle types that
is bounded above and below, so that v  nH + nM < 2v. This is because a very small middle
class, when coupled with a small high class, cannot de-stabilize a partition structured around T ,
while a large enough middle class will leave room for T to structure a stable partition again, this
time thanks to the fact that the remaining middle type agents not in T will be able to achieve
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the highest mean meritocratic coalition, the one formed by medium type agents alone. In the case
nH + nM < 3v=2; unstructured societies must contain a su¢ cientnumber of low types to allow
high type agents to challenge a partition structured around T with a meritocratic coalition. Finally,
(iii) unstructured societies are not able to satisfy medium type agents. Any partition structured
around a meritocratic coalition Gwith high type agents can always be challenged by some of the
medium type agents.
We will write H(G); M(G); and L(G) to denote respectively the high, medium and low type
agents in G. The formal denition of a structured society is as follows.
Denition 6. A three type society is structured if at least one of the following three conditions
holds:
1. N has a weak top coalition.
2. Either (nH + nM ) 12  v; or (nH + nM ) 23 < v and for all G meritocratic such that all i 2 G \ T
are better o¤ in G than in T; 0  n  2v < #L(G):
3. There exists a meritocratic coalition G1 with G1 \H 6= ; and #(NnG1)  v such that:
(a) G1  G for all meritocratic coalition G  (G1 [ H(G2) [ G3) where G2 = T (NnG1) and
G3 = Nn(G1 [G2); and
(b) Either #(H [M)nG1 = v or #(M [H(G2)) < v; M  G1 and T (M[(NnG1)) < m:
A three type society is unstructured if it is not structured, that is, if none of the above conditions
holds.
Note that condition 1 is a limited version of the weak top coalition condition. Recall that the
latter is a su¢ cient condition for the existence of core stable structures in general hedonic games.
Here we only need to require the existence of a weak top coalition of N , the set of all agents. Also
remark that, in view of Proposition 1, this condition is an easy one to check. Given its transparency,
we do not elaborate any further regarding it. Condition 2, then, species that a society may still be
structured, this time around the top set T , in the absence of a weak top coalition for N , provided
the set of middle productivity agents is small enough or large enough, in the sense of point
(ii) in our preceding discussion. Notice that these cases essentially extend the ideas we discussed
when v = n=2, for the case where the segregated partition is stable. Similarly, though with some
added complication, condition 3 provides conditions for the existence of a stable organizational
structure around a non-segregated coalition, in the spirit of the maximally mixed meritocratic
societies discussed in subsection 4.1.
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Thus, the denition of a structured society is "nested" in the following sense: Condition 1 is a
su¢ cient condition for existence of stable organizational structures. If condition 1 does not hold,
condition 2 is su¢ cient for the existence of stable organizational structures, and nally, if neither
condition 1 nor condition 2 hold, condition 3 is su¢ cient for the existence of stable organizational
structures. Furthermore, if none of the conditions hold the core is empty. The following proposition
formally states these results.
Proposition 5. There exist core stable organizational structures for a three type society if and
only if the society is structured.13
Proof. Part 1: Structured societies have core stable organizational structures.
For each condition assuring a structured society we describe how to construct a core stable organi-
zational structure.
(i) Suppose condition 1 holds, i.e. there exist weak top coalitions in N . We rst argue that
there will always be one weak top coalition W such that NnW contains only two types. This is
because
- if nH  v; then H is weak top (in fact top), and therefore NnH contains two types of agents,
medium and low.
- if nH < v; and T is meritocratic, T is weak top and NnT contains at most two types of agents,
medium and low.
- if nH < v; T is egalitarian and weak top, then NnT contains at most two types of agents,
medium and low.
- if nH < v; T is egalitarian but not weak top, then any weak top coalition W must be
meritocratic with highest mean. W must contain some high type agents, because all agents in a
meritocratic coalition without high type agents will gain from adding one high type, whether this
enlarged set is egalitarian or meritocratic. In addition, W must contain all medium type agents,
because if one of them was left out, adding that agent would increase the coalition mean while
keeping meritocracy. Then NnW contains at most two types of agents, high and low.
Let us now construct a core stable structure. Take a weak top coalition W such that NnW
contains only two types. We have just shown that this is always possible. Let W be one of the
coalitions in the organizational structure. Note that because NnW it is composed of only two
13 A similar result could be proved if we relaxed the lexicographic assumption on preferences among equal reward
coalitions. It would involve a weakening of our present denition of structured societies, since it is clear that without
the assumption more stable organizational structures may exist.
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types, it has a core stable organizational structure; combining this structure with W we obtain a
core stable structure for our initial society.
(ii) Suppose that condition 1 does not hold but condition 2 holds. Since condition 1 does not
hold, T = f1; ::; vg is egalitarian, thus nH < v=2.
If nH+nM  2v; high and medium types alone can form two productive coalitions. Let G1 = T;
G2 =MnT; and G3 = L: Clearly (G1; G2; G3) is a core stable organizational structure.
If nH+nM < 2v; then nH+nM < 3v=2 and 0  n 2v < #L(G) for every meritocratic coalition
G such that all i 2 G \ T are better o¤ in G than in T: Let G1 = T; G2 = fv + 1; ::; 2vg (G2 is an
egalitarian coalition given that nH +nM < 3v=2); and G3 = Nn (G1 [G2) a coalition of low types.
Again (G1; G2; G3) is a core stable organizational structure. This is because the potential blocking
coalition of this structure is a meritocratic coalition G that contains low type agents. But since
low type agents in G2 are in an egalitarian coalition, they cannot be part of the blocking, and since
n   2v < #L(G); for any of those potential meritocratic coalitions blocking , low type agents in
G3 are not enough to form the potential blocking coalition G:
(iii) Last, suppose that condition 1 and 2 fail but condition 3 holds.
First of all note that, because of the failure of 1 and 2; nH < v=2 and nH + nM < 2v:
Second, because 3 holds, there exists a meritocratic coalition G1 with G1 \ H 6= ; and
#(NnG1)  v satisfying (a) and (b): Let  = (G1; G2; G3) where G2 = T (NnG1) and G3 =
Nn(G1 [G2):
If #(H [ M)nG1 = v; G2 is either an egalitarian coalition with high and medium types or
just a meritocratic coalition with medium type agents if all high type agents are in G1; and G3 is
a coalition of low types. If #(H [M)nG1 6= v; all the medium type agents are in G1; G2 is an
egalitarian coalition with high and low types and G3 is a coalition of low type agents if any. In
both cases, conditions a and b guarantee that  cannot be blocked.
Part 2: Unstructured societies have no core stable organizational structures.
Assume that neither 1 nor 2 nor 3 hold and that a core stable organization structure  exists.
Let G 2  such that G \ H 6= ;. We show that G cannot be meritocratic, nor egalitarian, nor
unproductive, which is a contradiction.
(i) Assume G is meritocratic.
Since condition 1 does not hold, there are no weak top coalitions in N: Then nH < v=2; because
otherwise the top set T would be a meritocratic coalition and it would be a weak top coalition of N:
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Thus, if G is a meritocratic coalition it must include three types of agents. Since there is no weak top
coalition, #NnG  v; because otherwise, if the remaining agents are in an unproductive coalition,
 can be blocked. Apart from G; no other productive coalition G0 2  with three types can be
meritocratic. Otherwise the medium type agents in the coalition with lower average productivity
can switch to that other coalition. This generates a meritocratic new coalition with a greater
average productivity that blocks . So, if  contains another productive coalition G0 with three
types, that G0 must be egalitarian and it must contain all the high type agents in (H [M)nG. If
G0 > m, replacing a low type in G0 by one of the medium types in G increases the average and
keeps egalitarianism, and this later coalition blocks . But if G0  m we contradict that  is core
stable as well - since switching one of the medium types from G0 to G increases the average in G
and keeps meritocracy. Thus, agents in NnG can only be organized in two-types coalitions, and the
high types in NnG are in an egalitarian coalition. Note also that medium type agents cannot be in
a coalition with just low type agents, because by joining G they increase the mean while keeping
meritocracy, and this new coalition will block : Thus,  contains G2 = T (NnG); which is either
egalitarian with high and medium types, or meritocratic with just medium type agents (if all high
type agents are in G), or egalitarian with high and low types if G contains all the medium agents.
In any case, the remaining agents, Nn(G [G2) are low type agents.
Since condition 3 does not hold, either (a) or (b) fails.
If (a) fails, a meritocratic coalition G0  (G [ H(G2) [ G3) where G2 = T (NnG) and G3 =
Nn(G [G2) exists with G0 > G. Since only high type agents in G2 are potentially part of this
meritocratic coalition, G0 blocks :
If (b) fails, then #(H[M)nG 6= v:Since, as we argue above,  cannot place medium type agents
in a coalition with just low type agents, then #(H [M)nG < v: Thus, all medium type agents are
in G; and  organizes NnG with an egalitarian coalition with high and low types and a coalition of
low type agents alone. If #(M [H(G2))  v; then the coalition of cardinality vwith high types not
in G and medium type agents is egalitarian (or meritocratic if only contains medium type agents)
and blocks . If #(M [ H(G2)) < v; the average productivity of T (M [ (NnG)) is greater than
m; which implies that T (M [ (NnG)) is an egalitarian coalition which blocks :
Because of all the above points, high type agents cannot be in a meritocratic coalition.
(ii) Assume next that G is egalitarian.
Then, since there are no weak top coalitions and high type agents cannot be in a meritocratic
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coalition, it must be that G = T: Since condition 2 does not hold, nH + nM < 2v and either
nH + nM  3v=2 or there exist a meritocratic coalition G such that all i 2 G \ T are better o¤
in G than in T and n  2v  #L(G):
In the rst case, any organizational structure containing the top set T; where agents in NnT
are organized in a stable way, is such that T (NnT ) is a meritocratic coalition with medium and low
types, and the remaining agents are just low type agents. Since T is not weak top, a meritocratic
coalition G0 exist such that all i 2 G0 \T are better o¤ in G0 than in T: This meritocratic coalition
contains high type agents in T and medium and low types in NnT:Medium type agents in NnT are
in a meritocratic coalition and low type agents are also in meritocratic coalitions or alone. Then G0
blocks  because (1) high type agents in G0 \T are better o¤ in G0 than in T; and (2) medium and
low types in G0 are better o¤ than in their respective coalitions because G0 has a greater mean.
In the second case, T (NnT ) is egalitarian, and the low agents in T (NnT ) cannot be used to
block  with a meritocratic coalition. But, since condition 2 fails, then a meritocratic coalition can
be constructed that blocks : This is because the remaining low types not in T neither in T (NnT )
are enough to construct G:
(iii) To conclude, assume G is unproductive.
Given that h 2 G is very welcome in any coalition, T blocks .
Hence, there are no core stable organizational structures.
Remark 1. (a) Note that when n < 2v; conditions 2 and 3 in the denition of a structured society
never hold because they involve restrictions that only apply when more than one coalition can form.
Hence, if n < 2v a society is structured if and only if N has weak top coalitions. This remark leads
us directly to the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of core stable organizational
structures that we already discussed in Proposition 2.
(b) Also note that, in a structured society that fails to satisfy conditions 1 and 2; all stable organi-
zation structures are non-segregated14. They are structured around a meritocratic coalition G that
may or may not contain all high type agents. If G leaves some high type agents out, these must be
organized in an egalitarian coalition. If G contains all the high type agents, there must be enough
medium type agents out of G to form a productive coalition by themselves. These conditions are
the analogue of the maximally mixed meritocratic property for general three-type societies.
14 If we relaxed the lexicographic assumption on preferences among equal reward coalitions, there still exist societies
where all stable organizational structures are non segregated, as shown by Example 8 in the Appendix.
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5. Three way clustered societies
In this section we extend our analysis of societies that can be divided into three classes to a much
more general case than the one we just considered. We now allow for agents within a class (or
cluster) to have di¤erent productivities, provided the agents in each class are su¢ ciently similar,
relative to that of agents in other classes, in terms that are made precise in the denition that
follows. With some adjustments, we provide a new denition of structured societies within this
larger context, and prove that being structured in the extended sense is very much related to the
existence of stable organizational structures, which again can be of di¤erent forms depending on
distributional characteristics. This extension proves that our previous results, based on a simplied
model are robust, even if we do not get a full characterization result as we did before.
Denition 7. A society S = (N;; v) is three clustered if there exists a partition of N into three
coalitions fH;M;Lg (clusters)15 with the following properties:
C1. For all h 2 H; m 2M; and l 2 L; h > m > l:
C2. For any J 2 fH;M;Lg; all segregated productive subcoalitions of J are meritocratic.
C3. For any J , J 0 2 fH;M;Lg; J 6= J 0 such that i < j for all i 2 J; j 2 J 0; and for any SJ  J
and SJ 0  J 0 i < SJ[SJ0 < j for all i 2 SJ ; for all j 2 SJ 0 :
C4. For all SH  H; SL  L and j 2 M and SM  M; if SH[fjg[SL < j (resp > j); then
SH[SM[SL < i (resp > i) for all i 2 SM :
Condition C1 just requires that clusters must be formed by agents whose productivities are
correlative in the natural order, and thus allows to properly speak about the high, the medium
and the low cluster. All the agents with the same productivity must belong to the same cluster.
Condition C2 is an intracluster condition. It always holds if for example productivities of the
agents in a cluster are uniformly distributed or have a concave distribution, that is, for any three
consecutive agents i; j; k 2 J with i  j  k; k   j  j   i. Conditions C3 and C4 are
intercluster conditions. Condition C3 requires that there should be enough "distance" between
any two clusters. Condition C4 requires that the average of productivities for any set containing
elements of the three clusters should be "strictly between" clusters. That is, either it belongs to
the interval (minj2SH j ;maxj2SM j) or to the interval (minj2SM j ;maxj2SL j):
15 When this does not lead to confusion and in order to avoid repetitions we may sometimes refer to those agents
belonging to the same cluster as being of the same type. Notice however that unlike in the preceding section this
loose way to speak does to imply that two members of a cluster are identical.
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The following notation will be useful in what follows. Given a society (N;; v) and any set G 
N of cardinality nG; kG denotes the maximal number of productive coalitions of size v in G and
rG = nG  kGv. Subsets of G are denoted SG. The partition of the rst kGv elements of G into kG
segregated minimal size productive coalitions is denoted by (S1G:::S
kG
G ) : that is, S
1
G = T (G) and
SkG = T (Gn [k 1k=1 SqG):
Remark 2. Our denition allows for three clustered societies which are degenerate in the sense
that some of the clusters may be empty. In these cases, it is easy to prove that core stable organi-
zational structures exist. When only one cluster in non empty, only the intracluster condition C2
is operative. And then, the segregated partition of the kNv most productive agents into kN meri-
tocratic coalitions of size v; along with an unproductive coalition formed by the rN less productive
agents is trivially core stable.
In societies with two non-empty clusters, say H and L; let RH be the set that contains the last rH
agents in cluster H and at most the v rH most productive agents in cluster L: If nL < v rH ; RH
is an unproductive coalition and the structure (fSkHgkHk=1; RH) is core stable. If nL  v rH , let L^ be
the remaining agents in the low cluster, that is, L^ = LnRH : Then (fSqHgkHq=1; RH ; fSqL^g
kL^
q=1; U); where
U is an unproductive coalition formed by the rL^ less productive agents is a core stable structure.
We now turn to the non degenerate case with three non empty clusters. Our rst result refers
to the distribution of agents from the high cluster within any core stable organization.
Proposition 6. If a three cluster society S has a core stable structure, then at most v   1 agents
in H belong to coalitions containing agents from other clusters.
Proof. Let ^ be a core stable organizational structure for society S. Denote by SH the
subcoalition of the high cluster whose agents are assigned in ^ to coalitions containing individuals
from other clusters. Refer to coalitions containing agents from at least two clusters as mixed
coalitions. Assume that #SH  v: If all mixed coalitions containing agents from SH are egalitarian,
by condition C3 the high type members receive a payo¤ below their productivity. In this case, the
coalition SH ; which has a greater average, will block ^ independently of its regime. If some of the
mixed coalitions containing agents from SH are meritocratic, we distinguish two cases:
(i) Suppose that there is at least a productive subcoalition of SH which is meritocratic. Then, this
subcoalition constitutes a blocking coalition of ^; because it is meritocratic and has a greater mean
that any of the other coalitions in ^ containing agents from SH :
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(ii) Suppose all productive subcoalitions of SH are egalitarian. Consider the meritocratic coalition
in ^ containing agents from SH with the greatest mean. Call this coalition G. Let j 2 G be the
agent in G not in SH with the greatest productivity in G. Form the coalition G0 = SH [ fjg: The
coalition G0 is meritocratic because agents in SH form a majority and, by C3; the average of the
coalition is between the productivity of the less productive agent in SH and j : If G0 6= G; then
G0 is a blocking coalition of ^: If G0 = G; suppose rst that some agents of the high cluster not in
SH are organized in an egalitarian coalition. This implies that some of those agents are receiving
less than their productivity. Add those agents to G0: The new coalition is meritocratic with a
greater mean than G0; and will block ^: Suppose now that all agents outside SH are organized
in meritocratic coalitions. Since SH form an egalitarian coalition, it is non-segregated nor are
some of the coalitions with high types outside SH : Order the coalitions in HnSH so that the rst
one is the one that contains the highest productivity agent, the second the one which contain the
highest productivity agent among the remaining agents, and so on. Consider the rst coalition in
this order which is non-segregated and let i be the agent with the greatest productivity in that
coalition. Form the segregated productive coalition of cardinality v that contains i as the highest
productivity agent. Note that to form this coalition we could use agents in SH : Clearly this new
meritocratic coalition will block ^:
All the above arguments imply that at most v   1 agents in H belong to coalitions containing
agents from other clusters.
In view of Proposition 6 it is important to understand the characteristics of core stable organi-
zational structures in societies with at most v   1 agents in the high cluster.
We rst dene a condition that is necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of core stable
organizational structures for such societies. It is a natural extension of our previous notion of
structured societies.
Denition 8. A non degenerate three clustered society with nH < v is structured if the following
holds:
1. N has a weak top coalition.
2. For all G meritocratic such that all i 2 G \ T are better o¤ in G than in T; either the
society (NnT; NnT ; v) has a core stable structure, 1; such that #fi 2 MnT j (payo¤ of i in
1) < ig < #M(G); or #fi 2 LnT j (payo¤ of i in 1)  ig < #L(G):
3. There exists a meritocratic coalition G1 with G1 \H 6= ; and #(NnG1)  v such that:
27
(a) G1  G for all meritocratic coalitions G  (G1 [ H(G2) [ G3) where G2 = T (NnG1) and
G3 = Ln(G1 [G2):
(b) Either the society ((H [ M)nG1; H[M)nG1 ; v) has a core stable structure with segregated
coalitions all of them productive, or #(M [H(G2)) < v; M  G1 and T (M[(NnG1)) < m:
Proposition 7. A non degenerate three clustered society with nH < v has a core stable organiza-
tional structure if and only if it is structured.
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 5 and is presented in the Appendix.
Finally, we provide two results regarding core stability in societies with v or more agents in the
high cluster. One is a necessary condition and the other a su¢ cient condition for existence. Both
are based on our previous results.
For this purpose, we introduce some additional notation.
Given a non degenerated three cluster society S; let CH be the set of core stable structures for
(H;H ; v); the subsociety formed by the high cluster agents. For any  2 CH ; let U be the set of
unproductive agents in  and let S = (U [M [L; U[M[L; v): That is: we take those high type
agents, U; that would be in an unproductive coalition within a stable organization  of the high
cluster, and consider the subsociety, S; that they would form along with agents in the medium
and low clusters.
Proposition 8. If a three cluster society S has a core stable structure, then there exists  2 CH
such that subsociety S is structured.
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of Propositions 6 and 7 and the fact that subpartitions
of a stable organization must be stable within their subsociety.
Recall that by Remark 2 the subsociety (H;H ; v) has at least one core stable structure, namely
the segregated partition. Denote it by s = (fSkHgkHk=1; RH): With this notation, the su¢ cient
condition reads as follows.
Proposition 9. Consider a three clustered society S. If the subsociety Ss = (RH [ M [
L; RH[M[L; v) is structured then S has a core stable organization.
Proof. Take s 2 CH , that is s = (fSkHgkHk=1; RH), and let (S
S
) be a core stable structure
of Sc . Let us see that (S) = (fSkHgkHk=1; (S
c
)) is a core stable structure of S: If a set G blocks
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(S) it must contain agents from HnRH and agents fromM [L: But, given conditions C3 and C4,
the high type agents in a mixed coalition are always worse o¤ than in a meritocratic coalition with
just high type agents (as they are in fSkHgkHk=1). This holds because the average of productivities in
a mixed coalition is always smaller than the productivity of the less productive agent in the high
type cluster. Thus, (S) is core stable.
For this general case we do not reach a full characterization result. There is some gap between
the necessary and su¢ cient condition for existence. The necessary condition is not su¢ cient because
the productive coalitions in the core stable partition of the high cluster may not match consistently
with the core stable partition of the rest of society to form an overall stable organization. The
su¢ cient condition is not necessary because the segregated partition of the high cluster need not
be the only form to organize those agents within a core stable organization of the whole society.
6. Endogenous E¤ort
Our model has assumed that agents contributions to production are independent of the reward
system. This is consistent with our basic purpose in this paper, which is to analyze the consequences
of voting for one of two distributional criteria when neither undermines productive e¢ ciency. But
we believe that, in fact, reward systems will a¤ect e¤ort whenever e¤ort is costly and agents
are allowed to choose how much to contribute to the coalitions they join. In this section we
present a simple model where individual e¤ort decisions are strategic, and agents are still allowed
to vote between meritocracy and egalitarianism. Clearly, in such a model, the decision to join a
meritocratic coalition will become favored by the fact that, under this reward scheme, the most
productive workers will be willing to exert more e¤ort. We can show that, even within this more
elaborate version of the model, our basic conclusion that di¤erent regimes can coexist at equilibrium
still holds. Hence, we can interpret our basic model as one that gives the most advantage to
the emergence of egalitarianism, but whose main results persist after the productive benets of
meritocracy are taken into account.
Here is the model. Given a society (N;; v) we assume that a coalition G with cardinality g  v;
produces
P
i2G iei; where ei is the voluntary e¤ort of agent i, which has (individually incurred)
cost 12e
2
i : That is, if agent i exerts e¤ort ei she obtains:
Mi = iei  
1
2
e2i ; if G is meritocratic, and
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Ei =
P
j2G jej
g
  1
2
e2i , if G is egalitarian.
We assume that for each coalitionG and each reward regime agents choose e¤orts simultaneously
and non-cooperatively. Hence endogenous e¤orts will be determined by the unique Nash equilibrium
of this non cooperative game. It is easy to check that the Nash equilibrium choice of e¤orts are as
follows.
In an egalitarian coalition individuals have strong incentives to free ride; they exert e¤ort only
in a fraction 1=g of their productivity eEi = i=g: Hence, the payo¤s from membership in egalitarian
coalition G are
Ei =
P
j2G 
2
j
g2
  
2
i
2g2
:
On the other hand, in a meritocratic coalition individuals exert e¤ort equal to their productivity
eMi = i: Hence, the payo¤s from membership in any meritocratic coalition are
Mi =
2i
2
:
Preferences regarding meritocracy and egalitarianism inside each productive coalition are a bit
more complex than in the baseline model. Agent i 2 G prefers meritocracy rather than egalitari-
anism if and only if Mi  Ei ; or equivalently,
2i
2

P
j2G 
2
j
g2 + 1
: (6.1)
Additionally, only if necessary to compare two coalitions with the same regime and identical payo¤;
the lexicographic preference for greater per capita production applies.
Consider now the vote inside each coalition. Note that if the median member of coalition
G prefers meritocracy to egalitarianism, then all agents with a greater productivity share this
preference. Hence, the median productivity member of each coalition remains decisive voter of the
coalition in the present set up.
Meritocracy prevails more often than in the baseline model, since condition (6.1) may hold for
a median with productivity m(G)  G . However the qualitative results of our baseline model
are robust. In particular, scenarios where stable organizations structures deliver non-segregated
coalitions and heterogeneous distribution regimes still exist.
For three-type societies where n = 2v the conditions analogous to the "maximally mixed
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meritocratic societies" that deliver a non-segregated structure in the core are the following:
1. nH < v=2; nL  v=2; and (M=H)2 < (2nH)=((v 1)2+2nH); i.e., T is egalitarian and NnT
is meritocratic, and
2. 2M=2  (2H + 2M + nL2L)=((nL + 2)2 + 1); i.e. T is not weak top.
Example 7 is a society where the stable organization is non-segregated and di¤erent coalitions
select di¤erent regimes.
Example 7. Endogenous e¤ort and a society with stable non-segregated organizations and di¤erent
regimes.
Let N = f1; :::; 14g;  = (13; 13; 13;p8;p8;p8;p8;p8;p8;p8;p8; 0; 0; 0); v = 7:
T is egalitarian (because 2M=2 = 4 < 7:1 = (
P
j2T 
2
j )=(g
2 + 1)); NnT is meritocratic (because
2M=2 = 4 > 3:2 = (
P
j2T 
2
j )=(g
2+1)) with an average production equal to 4: 571 4: But (T;NnT )
is not stable because the coalition of agents with productivities (13;
p
8;
p
8;
p
8; 0; 0; 0) (where the
three medium type agents are from NnT ) is a meritocratic coalition with an average production of
27: 571 that blocks (T;NnT ):
The structure f(1; 4; 5; 6; 12; 13; 14); (2; 3; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11)g where the rst coalition is meritocratic and
the second is egalitarian is (uniquely) stable.
7. Concluding Remarks
We have presented a very simple model of coalition formation where people are driven to cooperate
by a minimal size requirement, and choose their reward schemes by majority. This model is able
to generate a variety of interesting stylized facts that are under examination in di¤erent strands of
literature, through more complex formulations.
Societies in equilibrium can generate non-segregated partitions, where agents of several types
do mix even if they could have joined individuals of the same or the closest type. This is a direct
consequence of the fact that coalitions choose among two rewards schemes by vote, and it is a
phenomenon that would not occur if agents were forced to use one of the two, or else allowed
to freely bargain on the distribution of their joint output. Moreover, non-segregation may arise
under meritocracy or under egalitarianism, and these two regimes can coexist. The possibility of
non-segregation, which may arise in di¤erent cases, does become a requirement for stability in well-
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dened cases, according to our characterization results. These cases are simple to interpret when
agents are only of three types and at most two coalitions can be formed. Then, non-segregation is
required for the stability of societies with an abundant middle class and a small number of high
and low-productivity agents. In more general cases, the conditions under which segregation in at
last some of the coalitions become necessary to achieve stability are still spelled out in our results.
Let us comment on the sensitivity of our results to alternative specications of the model. We
have already shown, by means of the example, in Section 6 that allowing agents to condition their
e¤ort within coalitions to their expected rewards does not alter our conclusions regarding non-
segregation and diversity of regimes. We have also tested, in further work, that the characteristics
of our discrete coalition formation model can be retained by an alternative formulation involving a
continuum of agents, a familiar assumption in the public economics literature.
An important assumption in our model that deserves comment is that agents must chose between
only two reward systems. Our reward systems can be seen as resulting from a model of tax
choice where a proportional tax t is levied and its proceeds are equally distributed: egalitarianism
corresponds to the case t = 1 and meritocracy arises when t = 0, since voters will always favor one
of these two extreme cases as their best choice. Our implicit assumption that taxes are proportional
and its proceeds are equally redistributed would certainly be worth relaxing by considering a larger
variety of reward schemes. In further research we are exploring an extension of our model that
will link our work more directly to the literature on optimal taxation and mobility (Mirrlees (1971,
1981), Epple and Romer (1991), Puy (2007), Morelli et al (2012), Bierbrauer et al (2013)).
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8. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof consists of two parts.
Part 1: Weak top coalitions of G are congruent coalitions of G and must belong to either
M+(G) or to E+(G):
If W is a weak top coalition of G then it is a congruent coalition of G.
Next we show that if G has a weak top coalition, W; then W  S for all S  GnW: Suppose
on the contrary that there is a coalition S  GnW such that W < S : Suppose rst that there is
an agent i 2 W such that W  i < S : Let S0 = S [ fig: Since i < S ; the mean productivity
of coalition S0 will be bigger than the productivity of i; i < S0 : Thus, agent i; independently of
the regime will be better o¤ in S0 than in W; in contradiction with W being a weak top coalition.
If there is no agent i 2 W such that W  i < S ; we distinguish two cases: in the rst one we
suppose that W is egalitarian and in the second we suppose that W is meritocratic.
If W is egalitarian, since no agent i 2 W exists such that W  i < S ; then an agent i 2 W
exists such that S  i: Let S0 = S [ fig; note rst that W < S[fig  i: So, independently of
the regime of S0; agent i will be better o¤ in S0 than in W; in contradiction with W being a weak
top coalition.
If W is meritocratic, since no agent i 2 W exists such that W  i < S ; the median
productivity of W is above S : Let med(W ) be this median productivity. Let i 2 W such that
i < W : Suppose rst that there is an agent j 2 S such that i < j  med(W ): Let W 0 =
(Wnfig) [ fjg: Note that since the productivities of agents i and j are both below the median
productivity of W; replacing in W agent i by agent j does not change the median but increases the
average. Thus, all agents in W 0 \W are better o¤ in W 0 than in W; in contradiction with W being
a weak top coalition. Finally, if there is no an agent j 2 S such that i < j  med(W ); then
there is an agent j 2 S such that j < i < W : Let S0 = (Snfjg) [ fig; S0 > S > W > i:
Thus, independently of the regime of S0; agent i will be better o¤ in S0 than in W; in contradiction
with W being a weak top coalition.
Suppose now that the weak top coalition is meritocratic but does not belong to M+(G): Note
rst that W \ M+ = ; for all M+ 2 M+(G); because otherwise, all agents in W \ M+ would
strictly prefer M+ to W contradicting that W is a weak top coalition. Since W \M+ = ;; our
previous reasoning applies, and therefore W  M : But then W 2 M+(G); a contradiction: The
same argument applies if W is an egalitarian coalition.
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Part 2: If a set in M+(G) or in E+(G) is a congruent coalition of G then it is a weak top
coalition of G:
Suppose M+ 2 M+(G) is a congruent coalition of G: If M+ is a segregated coalition with the
best productivity agents in G; it is clearly a weak top coalition of G. If it is not of the preceding
form, suppose that M+ is not a weak top coalition of G. Since it is congruent but not weak top,
there is no subcoalition of agents in M+ for which M+ is the best coalition. This implies that the
most productive agent in G is not in M+; and for the most productive agent in M+ there is an
egalitarian coalition E which is preferred to M+: But then all agents in E \M+ would be better
o¤ in E; in contradiction with M+ being congruent.
Suppose nally that E+ 2 E+(G) is a congruent coalition of G: If E+ is a segregated coalition
with the best productivity agents in G; it is clearly a weak top coalition of G. If it is not of the
preceding form, suppose that E+ is not a weak top coalition of G. Since it is congruent but not
weak top, there is no a subcoalition of agents in E+ for which E+ is the best coalition. But note
that for the less productive agent in this coalition E+ is always its best set, a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4
In fact, proving (b) and (c) implies (a). We start by statement (b).
(b1) To prove that (M3; N=M3) is a stable organizational structure, rst notice that medium
type agents in NnM3 can only improve upon if they can join an egalitarian coalition with highest
mean. But such superior coalition must include high type agents from M3 that are not willing to
join since M3 is meritocratic. High type agents in NnM3 if any, could be better o¤ joining an
egalitarian coalition with greater mean or a meritocratic coalition. The rst case is ruled out by the
same argument as for medium type agents. The second is not possible either since, by construction,
there is no other meritocratic coalition that can be formed without using other medium type agents
from N=M3.
(b2) The proof that (M3; N=M3) is the only core stable structure proceeds as follows.
- We rst show that no structure with only one productive coalition can be core stable. Such
productive coalition would have to be weak top. Candidates to be weak top coalitions are G 2
E+(N); or G 2M+(N):
If G 2 E+(N); G has size v, contradicting that the organizational structure includes only
one productive coalition. In a maximally mixed meritocratic society, nH < v=2; nL  v=2; and
consequently nM > v; which imply that the top set T is egalitarian, T 2 E+(N); and any other
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G 2 E+(N) is equivalent to T:
If G 2 M+(N); then G contains only medium type agents. This is because any meritocratic
coalition with high type agents has the mean below the productivity of the medium type agents,
and nM > v: But coalitions composed only of medium type agents are never weak top, because its
members always prefer to add high types to their coalition.
- We now concentrate in organizational structures containing two productive coalitions (G1; G2) 6=
(M3; NnM3); and prove that there will always be a coalition blocking (G1; G2).
(i) If G1 and G2 are both meritocratic, both coalitions have three types of agents or one of
them three types and the other two types, medium and low. In any case, adding the medium type
agents to the coalition with greater mean forms a meritocratic coalition with increased mean that
blocks (G1; G2):
(ii) If G1 and G2 are both egalitarian then none of them is T , because NnT is meritocratic
since we are in a maximaly mixed meritocratic society by assumption. Thus, T blocks (G1; G2):
(iii) If G1 is meritocratic and G2 is egalitarian, then G2 6= T , because otherwise, G1 = NnT
and then M3 blocks (T;NnT ): The coalition G2 cannot have three types of agents, because by
replacing low types in G2 by medium types, the mean increases while keeping egalitarianism. This
new coalition will block (G1; G2): Thus, G2 can only contain two types of agents. Since nH < v=2;
nL  v=2; G2 contains only high and medium types. Since G2 is di¤erent from NnM3 it must
contain more high type agents. But then, given the construction of M3; we can replace medium
type agents in G1 by high type agents while keeping meritocracy and increasing the mean, and this
new coalition will block (G1; G2):
Thus, (M3; NnM3) is the unique core stable organizational structure.
(c1) The existence statement in part (c) follows from the analysis of di¤erent possibilities, that
we take in turn. If society is not maximally mixed meritocratic, then either nH  v=2; or nL > v=2;
or nH < v=2 and nL  v=2 but (h + m + nLl)=(nL + 2) > m:
- If nH  v=2; T 2M+(N); and therefore is a weak top coalition. Thus, (T;NnT ) is a core stable
organizational structure.
- If nH < v=2; but nL > v=2; T can be meritocratic (with three types) or egalitarian (with high
and medium types). In the rst case T 2 M+(N); and therefore is a weak top coalition. Thus,
(T;NnT ) is a core stable organizational structure. In the second case, (T;B) is such that T is
egalitarian and B is either egalitarian or meritocratic with just low type agents. In any of the
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situations (T;B) is clearly a core stable organizational structure.
- Finally, if nH < v=2 and nL  v=2 but (h + m + nLl)=(nL + 2) > m; T only contains
high types and medium type agents and it is egalitarian, NnT contains only medium and low type
agents and is meritocratic. Condition (h + m + nLl)=(nL + 2) > m implies that high type
agents cannot be part of a meritocratic coalition, thus T is a weak top coalition of N and (T;NnT )
is a core stable organizational structure.
(c2) We distinguish three cases.
Case 1. Assume nH  v=2:
There may exist a second core stable structure if (i) G 2 E+(N), #G > v; and G is a weak top
coalition, or (ii) G 2 E+(N), #G = v; and NnG is also egalitarian16.
If (i), since G is a weak top coalition, (G;NnG) is core stable and only G is productive.
If (ii), since both G and NnG are egalitarian, (G;NnG) is a core stable organizational structure
with two productive coalitions. To see that, note that no coalition can block (G;NnG) because
such coalition would have to be meritocratic and thus formed by agents that are receiving less
than their productivity in (G;NnG): Given that both coalitions in (G;NnG) are egalitarian, those
agents are the ones whose productivities are above the mean of the coalition, and since the mean
is above the median, they are less than v=2 in each coalition. Hence they cannot form a productive
coalition blocking (G;NnG).
Let us see that, apart from this possible second core stable structure, there can be no other.
In structures (P;NnP ) where only P is productive, if P is not weak top, there will exist
a productive coalition G such that all i 2 P \ G will be better o¤ in G than in P: Since all
i 2 (NnP ) \ G are getting zero in NnP; they will also be better o¤ in G. Thus, G will block
(P;NnP ): Hence, P has to be weak top, and the unique candidate in this case is the one described
in (i):
Finally, let us show that any structure (G1; G2) with two productive coalitions di¤erent from
(T;NnT ) and the one considered in case (ii) will be unstable.
(1) If G1 and G2 are meritocratic, it is blocked by T which is also meritocratic.
16 This last situation can only happen if vL > v=2: To see this, note that, since T is meritocratic, high type agents
have to be distributed between G and NnG: Furthermore, let us see that all medium type agents have to be in G: If
G < m, the median agent is a low type agent, and NnG has to contain three types. Adding a high, a medium, and
a low type agent to G from NnG will create a new egalitarian group of higher mean, contradicting that G 2 E+(N).
If G  m, adding a high and a medium type to G from NnG will create a new egalitarian group of higher mean.
Again, this contradicts that G 2 E+(N): Thus, G contains all the medium type agents. Therefore, for NnG to be
egalitarian, vL > v=2:
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(2) If G1 is meritocratic and G2 is egalitarian we distinguish two cases.
- If all the high type agents are in G1, G2 can only contain medium and low types, and since
it is egalitarian G < m: But then, adding a medium type agent from G2 to G1 creates a new
meritocratic coalition of higher mean than G1which blocks (G1; G2):
- If the high type agents are split between G1 and G2, we can add all missing high type agents
to G1 and drop enough non high types in G1 to create a new coalition of size v: This new coalition
will still be meritocratic, have a higher mean than G1, and block (G1; G2):
(3) If G1 and G2 are egalitarian, neither G1 nor G2 are in E+(N): Thus, any egalitarian
coalition G 2 E+(N) will block (G1; G2):
Case 2. Assume nH < v=2 and nL > v=2:
In this case, T can be either egalitarian or meritocratic.
Case 2a. Suppose rst that T is meritocratic.
Since nH < v=2; T has three types of agents and consequently NnT is the meritocratic coalition
with just low types, which implies that nL > v.
As in Case 1, a second core stable structure may exist if (i) G 2 E+(N), #G > v; and G is a
weak top coalition, or (ii) G 2 E+(N), #G = v; and NnG is also egalitarian17. The same argument
as in Case 1 applies.
Let us see that, apart from this possible second core stable structure, there can be no other.
As explained in Case 1, structures (P;NnP ) where only P is productive are core stable if and
only if P is a weak top coalition. The unique candidate in this case is the one described in (i):
Finally, let us show that any structure (G1; G2) with two productive coalitions di¤erent from
(T;NnT ) and the one considered in case (ii) will be unstable.
The arguments in (a) and (b) in Case 1 apply here.
In the case that G1 is meritocratic and G2 is egalitarian, G2 must contain at least two types of
agents. If G2 contains high type agents, replacing a low type agent in G1 by a high type agent will
create a new meritocratic coalition G (because T is meritocratic) of higher mean than G1 which
blocks (G1; G2): The same kind of argument will apply if G2 does not contains high type agents
but contains medium type agents.
Case 2b. Suppose that T is egalitarian. Since nH < v=2; T has two or three types of agents
17 Note that since T is meritocratic, this situation can only happen if G contains all the high type agents and v vH
low type agents and it should be such that adding a medium type changes the regime. This structure only exists if
vH = v=2  1 and vM < v=2:
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and consequently NnT is either egalitarian with medium and low types or meritocratic with only
low type agents. There may exist a second core stable structure if (i) G 2 M+(N), #G > v; and
G is a weak top coalition, or (ii) if G 2M+(N), #G = v, NnG is egalitarian, (NnG)\M = ;; and
the mean productivity of the coalition is below m:
If (i), since G is a weak top coalition, (G;NnG) is core stable and only G is productive.
If (ii), since the mean productivity of NnG is below m; (G;NnG) is core stable. There is no
possibility of blocking because a potential blocking coalition should contain medium type agents.
Since they are in a meritocratic coalition with the greatest mean, they will only participate in an
egalitarian coalition with mean above their productivity. But this is not possible.
Let us see that, apart from this possible second core stable structure, there can be no other.
As explained in Case 1, structures (P;NnP ) where only P is productive are core stable if and
only if P is weak top. The unique candidate in this case is the one described in (i):
Finally, let us show that any structure (G1; G2) with two productive coalitions di¤erent from
(T;NnT ) and the one considered in case (ii) will be unstable.
(1) If G1 and G2 are both egalitarian, it is blocked by T which is also egalitarian.
(2) If G1 and G2 are both meritocratic, and neither G1 nor G2 are in M+(N); any mer-
itocratic coalition G 2 M+(N) will block (G1; G2): If one of them belongs to M+(N) (let us say
G1 2M+(N)), since nH < v=2 and nL > v=2; both G1 and G2 contains medium type agents. Sup-
pose that G1  G2 : then adding a medium type agent from G2 to G1 creates a new meritocratic
coalition of higher mean than G1which blocks (G1; G2):
(3) If G1 is meritocratic and G2 is egalitarian, G1 may contain agents of two or three types.
In the rst case they must be medium and low types with a majority of medium types. Thus, G2
contains low type and high type agents and (possibly) medium types. In any case, T 2 E+(N)
blocks (G1; G2). If G1 contains three types, G2 can contain two or three types (with low and
medium types for sure in both cases). If G2 < m, adding a medium type agent from G2 to G1
creates a new meritocratic coalition of higher mean than G1;which blocks (G1; G2): If G2 > m,
replacing a low type in G2 with a medium type from G1 creates a new egalitarian coalition of higher
mean than G2, which blocks (G1; G2):
Case 3. Assume that nH < v=2; nL  v=2; and (h + m + nLl)=(nL + 2) > m.
Note that the meritocratic coalition with the greatest mean in this case is M , which is not a
weak top coalition. Thus, no other organizational structure with only one productive coalition can
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be core stable.
Let us show that any structure (G1; G2) with two productive coalitions di¤erent from (T;NnT )
will be unstable.
(1) Note that G1 and G2 cannot be both meritocratic, since there is no meritocratic coalition
that contains high type agents.
(2) If G1 and G2 are both egalitarian, it is blocked by T which is also egalitarian.
(3) If G1 is meritocratic and G2 is egalitarian, G1 can only contain medium and low types or
only medium type agents, but since this coalition is di¤erent from NnT; G2 must contain low type
agents also. Note that since G2 is egalitarian and low types do not constitute a majority, G2 > m:
Replacing in G2 low type agents by medium type agents from G1 will create a new egalitarian
coalition of higher mean than G2 which blocks (G1; G2):
Proof of Proposition 7. Part 1: Structured societies with nH < v have core stable organiza-
tional structures.
For each condition assuring a structured society we describe how to construct a core stable
organizational structure.
(i) Suppose condition 1 holds, i.e. there exist weak top coalitions in N . Let W be one of those
weak top coalitions. Note rst that NnW only contains agents from at most two clusters. This is
because either W = T and then NnT M [ L; or W is a meritocratic coalition with agents from
the three clusters. In the latter case, since W is a meritocratic coalition with maximal average
productivity it is necessary that M  W and then NnW  H [ L: Hence, by Remark 2, the
two-type society NnW has a core stable organizational structure. The coalitions in that structure
plus W constitute a core stable organizational structure for N .
(ii) Suppose that condition 1 does not hold but condition 2 does. Since condition 1 does not hold,
T is egalitarian, and (NnT; NnT ; v) is a two cluster society. Hence by Remark 2, (NnT; NnT ; v)
has a core stable organizational structure 1. Then  = fT; 1g is a core stable organization of N
because any coalition G potentially blocking  must be meritocratic and include agents from every
cluster, and either some i 2 M \ G is worse o¤ in G than in 1 (if #fi 2 MnT j (payo¤ of i in
1) < ig < #M(G)); or else some i 2 L \G is worse o¤ in G than in 1 (if #fi 2 LnT j (payo¤
of i in 1) < ig < #L(G)):
(iii) Last, suppose that conditions 1 and 2 fail but condition 3 holds.
There exists a meritocratic coalition G1 with G1 \H 6= ; and #(NnG1)  v satisfying a and b:
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Without loss of generality suppose that i 2 G1 \M are the agents with the lowest productivity in
M (note that if this is not the case, we can always replace each of the medium type agents in G1
by one less productive medium type agent without changing the above characteristics of G1): Also
without loss of generality, suppose that all i 2 G1\L are consecutive with the greater productivities
in L compatible with G1 being meritocratic. Suppose rst that society ((H [M)nG1; (H[M)nG1 ; v)
has a core stable structure with segregated coalitions, all of them productive. Let ((H [M)nG1)
be this structure. Consider the following organizational structure of N : the rst coalition is G1;
then all the coalitions in ((H [M)nG1) and nally the core stable structure of the remaining low
type agents, (LnG1): This structure is stable given conditions (a) and (b):Otherwise, if such core
structure ((H [M)nG1) does not exist, we consider the structure formed by G1 that contains all
the medium type agents (recall that since #(M [H(G2)) < v; medium type agents cannot form a
productive coalition on their own), by T (NnG1) that contains high and low types, and nally by
the core stable structure of the remaining low type agents, (Ln(G1[T (NnG1)): Again, conditions
(a) and (b) guarantee that this is a core stable organizational structure for N .
Part 2: Unstructured societies with nH < v have no core stable organizational structures.
Assume that neither 1 nor 2 nor 3 hold and that a core stable organization structure  exists.
Let G 2  such that G \ H 6= ;. We show that G cannot be meritocratic, nor egalitarian, nor
unproductive, which is a contradiction.
Assume G is meritocratic, let us see that the negation of conditions 1 and 3 lead to a contra-
diction.
Since condition 1 does not hold, there are no weak top coalitions in N: Then nH < v=2; because
otherwise T would be a meritocratic coalition and it would be a weak top coalition of N: Thus,
if G is a meritocratic coalition it must include agents from the three clusters (by C3). Since
there are no weak top coalitions, then #NnG  v; because otherwise, the remaining agents are
in an unproductive coalition and  can be blocked. Apart from G; no other productive coalition
G0 2  with agents from the three clusters can be meritocratic. Otherwise, given C4, an i 2 M in
the coalition with lower average productivity could switch to the other and increase the average
productivity while keeping meritocracy, and this new coalition would block . So, if  contains
another productive coalition G0 with three types, it must be egalitarian and it must contain all
i 2 HnG. If G0 > m for some m 2 M , replacing an agent from L in G0 by one from M in G
increases the average and keeps egalitarianism, and this later coalition blocks  (given that C4
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implies that G0 > j for all j 2 G0 \M ). But if G0  m for some m 2 M; we contradict
that  is core stable as well - since switching one of the agents in M from G0 to G increases the
average in G and keeps meritocracy. Thus, agents in NnG can only be organized in coalitions
with agents from one or two clusters, and all i 2 HnG are in an egalitarian coalition. Note also
that an agent i 2 M \ (NnG) cannot be in a coalition that does not contain agents from H;
because by joining G they increase the mean while keeping meritocracy, and this new coalition will
block : If MnG 6= ;;  contains G2 = T (NnG) which is egalitarian with agents from H and M ,
or meritocratic with just agents form M (if H  G). If there are still more agents in M , they
are organized in segregated meritocratic coalitions with just medium type agents. Note that they
cannot be organized in egalitarian coalitions because the agents in those coalitions that receive a
payo¤ below their productivity by joining G will increase the mean while keeping meritocracy. The
rest of society is composed by agents from L. If MnG = ;;  contains G2 = T (NnG) which is
egalitarian with T (NnG)  H [L, and again the remaining society is composed by agents from L.
Since condition 3 does not hold, either (a) or (b) fails:
-If (a) fails, a meritocratic coalition G0  (G [ H(G2) [ G3) where G2 = T (NnG) and G3 =
Ln(G1 [G2) exists with G0 > G. Note that G0 blocks .
-If (b) fails, the society ((H [M)nG1; H[M)nG1 ; v) cannot be organized in a segregated stable way
with all coalitions productive for any meritocratic coalition G1: Since, as we argued above,  cannot
place i 2M in coalitions without agents from H, it must be that #(H [M)nG < v: Thus, M  G;
and  organizes NnG with an egalitarian coalition E  H [ L such that HnG  E, and the rest
of low type agents are organized in an stable way. If #(M [ H(G2))  v; then the coalition of
cardinality v containing all i 2 HnG and some medium type agents is egalitarian (or meritocratic if
it only contains medium type agents) and blocks . If #(M [H(G2)) < v; the average productivity
of T (M [ (NnG)) is greater than m for some m 2 M; which implies that T (M [ (NnG)) is an
egalitarian coalition which blocks :
All the above points imply that a meritocratic G containing high type agents cannot be part of
a core stable organizational structure of N:
Assume next that G is egalitarian. Let us see that the negation of conditions 1 and 2 leads to
a contradiction.
Since there are no weak top coalitions and high type agents cannot be in a meritocratic coalition,
it must be that G = T: Since condition 2 does not hold, any possible stable organization of
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the society (NnT; NnT ; v) is such that #fi 2 MnT j (payo¤ of i in 1) < ig  #M(G); or
#fi 2 LnT j (payo¤ of i in 1)  ig  #L(G): Thus, the medium and low types necessary to
form the meritocratic coalition that would challenge T are available. This coalition will block :
To conclude, assume G is unproductive. But h 2 G is very welcome in any meritocratic coalition
(even if that changes the regime), and if there are no meritocratic coalitions, T blocks .
Hence, there are no core stable organizational structures.
Example 8. A society where all stable organizational structures are non segregated even if the
lexicographic assumption on preferences among equal reward coalitions is eliminated.
Let N = f1; :::; 18g ; v = 7; with three high type agents with h = 100; seven medium type
agents with m = 75; and eight low type agents with l = 64:5: First remark that the grand coalition
is meritocratic, stable and forms a non segregated organizational structure. Moreover, notice that
there exists at least another stable and non segregated organizational structure. It is the one with
two productive meritocratic groups, one containing two high, four medium and ve low type agents
and the other containing one high, three medium and three low type agents. Finally, let us argue
that segregated organizational structures are not stable. First notice that no high type can be left
out of a productive coalition. Hence, any stable segregated organizational structure must contain
a coalition with all high types in the same productive group. But in all segregated organizational
structures, the coalition containing these three high types is egalitarian. Thus, any candidate for
stability among the segregated organizational structures must contain the coalition with three high
and four medium type agents, since this is the egalitarian coalition with the greatest mean. But
for the same reason, it must also contain the coalition with the remaining three medium types and
four low type ones, while leaving the rest of low type agents in an unproductive coalition. However,
this structure is not stable because it is blocked by the meritocratic coalition formed by one high,
the three medium type agents in the second coalition and the three low types in the unproductive
group.
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